

AN OBLIGATION TO TOMORROW



EDITOR'S NOTE: *A little more than a year ago The Saturday Review published the full text of Dr. Albert Schweitzer's "Declaration of Conscience," a plea to the world's peoples to inform themselves about the runaway nuclear-arms race. In particular, Dr. Schweitzer called attention to the hazards involved in nuclear explosions.*

Last fall, when the editor of The Saturday Review saw Dr. Schweitzer at his home in the Alsace, the philosopher-theologian-physician expressed grave concern about the possibility of a breakdown in the London talks then being held by the major powers on the subject of arms control. Dr. Schweitzer doubted that the nations would accept any such controls in the absence of a genuine demand by world public opinion. His apprehensions turned out to be correct.

After Dr. Schweitzer returned to Lambarene last year, he continued his correspondence on the human crisis with leading scientists, historians, and thinkers in various parts of the world. This exchange of ideas and information

fortified him in his view of the danger. Several months ago, he began to write an enlarged appeal, going beyond the question of nuclear experimentation into the general problem of world peace. He worked under difficult conditions, often late at night after the sounds had quieted down at his jungle hospital. His right hand had been injured as the result of a fall, and the splints on one of his fingers impeded his writing.

The new appeal, when completed, was divided into three parts, each dealing in a detailed way with separate aspects of the world problem. Like the Declaration of 1957, it was sent to the Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway, for world-wide distribution.

Once again, The Saturday Review feels privileged to present the full text of Dr. Schweitzer's message. Dr. Schweitzer has given the editors permission to translate and edit the text from the German. The editors wish to emphasize, therefore, that any flaws in language or structure are chargeable to them.

By ALBERT SCHWEITZER

IN APRIL of last year I raised my voice, together with others, to draw attention to the great danger of radioactive poisoning of the air and the earth, following tests with atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs. With others, I appealed to the nuclear powers to come to a workable agreement to stop the tests as soon as possible, at the same time declaring their genuine desire to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.

At that time there appeared to be reasonable hope that this step would be taken. It was not. The negotiations in London last summer achieved nothing. The conference arranged by the United Nations in the autumn of last year suffered the same fate when the Soviet Union withdrew from the discussions.

The question of nuclear arms control, however, cannot be put aside. Any discussions among the major nations will have to consider this problem.

As a first step in any comprehensive plan for workable arms control, the proposal for a cessation of nuclear tests has frequently been advanced.

One might have thought that it would be comparatively simple for all those involved to agree on this first step. No nuclear power would have to sacrifice any of the atomic weapons in its possession. The disadvantage of not being able to try out new bombs or nuclear devices would be the same for all.

The United States and Great Britain have been reluctant to take the first step. They spoke against it when the

matter was discussed in Spring 1957. Since then many statements have been issued claiming that the radioactivity resulting from nuclear tests is not dangerous. For example, in an official statement coming from the United States, we read the following: "The necessary steps should be taken to correct the present confusion of the general public [with respect to the effects of testing]. . . . The present and potential effects on heredity from the gradual increase of radioactivity in the air are kept within tolerable limits. . . . The possibility of harmful effects which people believe to be outside control has a strong emotional impact. . . . The continuation of nuclear tests is necessary and justified in the interests of national security."

Despite these assurances, however, people are becoming increasingly apprehensive concerning the possible dangers resulting from nuclear tests.

The reasoning behind the somewhat obscure statement that "the effects on heredity from the gradual increase of radioactivity in the air are kept within tolerable limits" is that the number of deformed children that will be born as a result of the harm done to the sexual cells supposedly will not be large enough to justify the stopping of the tests.

During this campaign of reassurance, a prominent American nuclear physicist even declared that the luminous watchdials in the world represent a greater danger than the radioactive fall-out of nuclear tests until now.

This campaign of reassurance sets up anticipations of

“... who has the right to ‘permit’ people to be exposed to dangers? ...”

glad tidings to the effect that science has succeeded in making the prototype of a hydrogen bomb with a considerably reduced dangerous radioactive fall-out. The new explosive is called a “clean” hydrogen bomb. The old type is being designated as the “dirty” bomb.

The so-called “clean” hydrogen bomb differs from the other in having a jacket made of a material which does not release immense quantities of radioactive elements at the enormous explosion temperature. That is why it is less harmful, as regards radioactivity, than the usual ones.

However, the new, highly-praised hydrogen bomb is—let it be said in passing—only relatively clean. Its trigger is an uranium bomb made of the fissionable uranium-235—an atomic bomb as powerful as the one dropped over Hiroshima. This bomb, when detonated, also produces radioactivity, as do the neutrons released in great numbers at the explosion.

Earlier this year, in an American newspaper, Edward Teller, the father of the “dirty” hydrogen bomb, sings a hymn of praise to the idyllic nuclear war to be waged with completely clean hydrogen bombs. He insists on a continuation of the tests in order to perfect this ideal bomb.

Here are two stanzas from Edward Teller’s hymn to idyllic nuclear warfare:

“Further tests will put us into a position to fight our opponents’ war machine, while sparing the innocent bystanders.”

“Clean weapons of this kind will reduce unnecessary casualties in a future war.”

The idea of limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. Each side will use all the power at its disposal in an attempt to annihilate the enemy. The U.S. Department of Defense has quite recently declared that the irradiation of whole areas has become a new offensive weapon.

THE “clean” hydrogen bomb may be intended, I fear, more for display-case purposes than for use. The intention seems to be to convince people that new nuclear tests will be followed by less and less radiation and that there is no real argument for the discontinuation of the tests.

Those who think that the danger created by nuclear tests is small mainly take the air radiation into consideration, and persuade themselves to believe that the danger limit has not yet been reached.

The results of their arithmetic are not so reliable, however, as they would have us believe. Through the years the toleration limit for radiation has had to be lowered several times. In 1934 it was 100 radiation units per year. At present the limit is officially put at 5. In many countries it is even lower. Dr. Lauriston Taylor (USA), who is regarded as an authority on protection against radiation, holds—like others—that it is an open question whether there is anything called a harmless amount of radiation. He thinks that we can only speak of an amount of radiation which we regard as tolerable.

We are constantly being told about a “maximum permissible amount” of radiation. What does “permissible” mean? And who has the right to “permit” people to be exposed to these dangers?

When speaking about the risk of radiation we must take

into consideration not only the radiation coming from the outside, but also the radioactivity that gets into our bodies.

What is the source of this radioactivity?

The radioactive materials put into the air by nuclear tests do not stay there permanently. In the form of radioactive rain—or even radioactive snow—they fall to the earth. They enter the plants through leaves and roots and stay there. We absorb them by drinking milk from cows or by eating the meat of animals which have fed on it. Radioactive rain contaminates our drinking water.

The most powerful radioactive poisoning occurs in the areas between the Northern latitudes 10° and 60°, because of the numerous nuclear tests conducted mainly in these latitudes by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The radioactive elements absorbed over the years by our body are not evenly distributed in the cellular tissue, but are deposited and accumulated at certain points. From these points internal radiation takes place, causing injuries to particularly vulnerable organs. What this kind of radiation lacks in strength is made up for by its longevity, working as it does for years, day and night.

IT IS a well-known fact that one of the most widespread and dangerous elements absorbed by us is strontium-90. It is stored in the bones and emits from there its rays into cells of red bone marrow, where the red and white corpuscles are made. If the radiation is too great, blood diseases—fatal in most cases—are the result.

The cells of the reproductive organs are particularly sensitive. Even relatively weak radiation may lead to fatal consequences.

The most sinister aspect of internal as well as external radiation is that years may pass before the evil consequences appear. Indeed, they make themselves felt, not in the first or second generation, but in the following ones. Generation after generation, for centuries to come, will witness the birth of an ever-increasing number of children with mental and physical defects.


It is not for the physicist, choosing to take into account only the radiation from the air, to utter the final word on the dangers of nuclear tests. That right belongs to the biologists and physicians who have studied internal as well as external radiation, and to those scientists who pay attention to the facts established by the biologists and physicians.

The declaration signed by 9,235 scientists of all nations, handed to the Secretary General of the U.N. by Dr. Linus Pauling on January 13, 1958, gave the campaign of reassurance a serious blow. The scientists declared that the radioactivity gradually created by nuclear tests represents a grave danger for all parts of the world, particularly serious because its consequences will be an increasing number of deformed children in the future. For this reason they insist on an international agreement putting an end to the nuclear tests.

The declaration signed by the 9,235 scientists did well in stressing the danger of the harmful effects of nuclear tests on future generations which, according to biologists and physicians, will be the result of the radiation to which we are being exposed.

We must not disregard our responsibility to guard

"It will be no excuse for us later to say we were unaware"



—Erica Anderson.

against the possibility that thousands of children may be born with the most serious mental and physical defects. It will be no excuse for us to say later that we were unaware of that possibility. Only those who have never been present at the birth of a deformed baby, never witnessed the whimpering cries of its mother, should dare to maintain that the risk of nuclear testing is a small one. The well-known French biologist and geneticist Jean Rostand calls the continuation of nuclear tests "a crime into the future" (*le crime dans l'avenir*). It is the particular duty of women to prevent this sin against the future. It is for them to raise their voices against it in such a way that they will be heard.

No longer can we take any comfort from the fact that the scientists do not agree on the question of the danger of radiation, or that we must await the decision of international bodies before making positive statements about radiation. Despite all the claims of safety, the truth about the danger of nuclear explosions marches imperturbably along, influencing an ever-increasing section of public opinion. In the long run, even the most well-organized propaganda can do nothing against the truth.

It is a strange fact that few people have taken into consideration that the question of nuclear testing is not one which concerns the nuclear powers exclusively, a question for them to decide at their pleasure. Who has given these countries the right to experiment, in times of peace, with weapons involving the most serious risks for the whole world? What has international law—enthroned by the United Nations and so highly praised in our time—to say on this matter? Does it no longer look out on the world from its temple? Then take it out, so that it may face the facts and do its duty accordingly.

International law should consider at once the compelling case of Japan. That country has suffered heavily from the effects of nuclear tests. The radioactive clouds created by the Soviet tests in Northeast Siberia and by the American tests in the Pacific Ocean are carried by the winds over Japan. The resultant radioactive poisoning is

considerable. Powerful radioactive rainfalls are quite common. The radioactive poisoning of the soil and the vegetation is so heavy that the inhabitants of some districts ought to abstain from using their harvest for food. People are eating rice contaminated by radioactive strontium, a substance particularly dangerous for children. The ocean surrounding Japan is also at times dangerously radioactive, and thereby the very food supply of the country—in which fish has always played an important part—is being threatened.

As every new nuclear test makes a bad situation worse, the Japanese ministers, when hearing of plans for new tests to the north or south of Japan, have presented their country's urgent appeal in Washington or Moscow, beseeching the American or Soviet authorities to give up their plans.

We generally learn about these appeals and the refusals through short newspaper items. Unfortunately, there have been few responsible editorials drawing our attention to the stories behind the news—the misery of human beings who are now in jeopardy. In that way, we and the press are guilty of a lack of compassion. Even guiltier, however, is international law, which has kept silent and indifferent on this question, year after year.

It is high time to recognize that the question of nuclear testing is a matter for world law to consider. Mankind is imperiled by the test. Mankind insists that they stop, and has every right to do so.

If anything is left of international law in our civilization, then the nations responsible for nuclear tests must renounce them immediately, without making this dependent on agreements with respect to the larger questions of general disarmament. Nuclear tests have nothing to do with disarmament. The nations in question will continue to have those weapons which they now have.

There is no time to lose. New tests must not be allowed to increase the already existing danger. It is important to realize that even without new tests the danger will increase during the coming years: a large part of the radioactive elements flung up in the atmosphere and stratosphere at the nuclear experiment is still there. It will come down only after several years—probably about fifteen.

The immediate renunciation of further tests will create a favorable atmosphere for talk on controlling the stock-piles of nuclear weapons and banning their use. When this urgently necessary step has been taken, such negotiations can take place in peace.

That the Soviet Union has announced its willingness to stop its tests is of great importance. The world now looks to the United States and Great Britain for the kind of moral initiative and action that go along with great leadership.

PART II

Today we are faced with the menacing possibility of an outbreak of an atomic war between Soviet Russia and the United States. It can only be averted if the two powers decide to renounce atomic arms.

How did this situation arise?

In 1945 America succeeded in producing an atomic

“... today there is little difference between local war or global war”

bomb with uranium-235. On August 6, 1945, this bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9.

When America came into the possession of such a bomb it held a military advantage over other countries.

In July 1949 the Soviet Union also test-exploded its first nuclear bomb. Its power was approximately equal to the American bomb then existing.

On October 3, 1952, England exploded its first atomic bomb on the Isle of Montebello (situated on the north-west coast of Australia).

In the quest for nuclear supremacy, both the Soviet Union and the United States moved towards the development of a nuclear weapon many times more powerful—the hydrogen bomb. A series of tests was undertaken by the United States in the Marshall Islands beginning in May 1951, and culminating in a successfully exploded hydrogen bomb in March 1954.

The actual power of the explosion was far stronger than had been originally calculated.

AT APPROXIMATELY the same time, the Soviet Union also started its experimentations, exploding its first hydrogen bomb on August 12, 1953.

Today, guided missiles can be launched from their starting points and directed with accuracy at distant targets. The larger explosives are carried by missiles containing the fuel necessary for their propulsion. The gases from this fuel rush with tremendous velocity through a narrow opening. Science is in the process of discovering a fuel which is similar and more efficacious to deal with.

It is said that the Soviet Union already has available rockets with a range up to 600 miles. Soon to come are rockets with a range up to 1,080 miles—if they are not already in use.

It is said that America is attempting to develop rockets with a range of 1,440 miles.

Whether the intercontinental ballistic missile, with its range of 4,800 miles, already exists cannot be ascertained. The Soviet Union has claimed it already has such a missile.

Even without respect to intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines could launch nuclear attacks on the United States.

The long-range rockets attain unbelievable speed. It is expected that an intercontinental rocket would not take more than twenty minutes to cross the ocean with a payload of nuclear explosive weighing from one to five tons.

How could an atomic war break out today? Not long ago there was talk of local or limited wars that could be contained. But today there is little difference between a local war or a global war. Rocket missiles will be used up to a range of 1,440 miles. The destruction should not be underestimated, even if caused only by a Hiroshima-type bomb.

It can hardly be expected that an enemy will refrain from using atomic bombs or the most devastating hydrogen bombs on large cities at the very outset of a war. One hydrogen bomb now exists that is a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bomb. It will have a destructive radius of many miles. The heat will be 100

million degrees. One can imagine how large would be the number of city-dwellers who would be destroyed by the pressure of the explosion, by flying fragments of glass, by heat and fire and by radioactive waves, even if the attack is only of short duration. The deadly radioactive contamination, as a consequence of the explosion, would have a range of some 45,000 square miles.

An American general has said to some Congressmen: “If at an interval of ten minutes 110 hydrogen bombs are dropped over the USA there would be a casualty list of about 70 million people; besides, some thousands of square miles would be made useless for a whole generation. Countries like England, West Germany, and France could be finished off with fifteen to twenty hydrogen bombs.”

President Eisenhower has pointed out, after watching maneuvers under atomic attack, that defense measures in a future atomic war become useless. In these circumstances all one can do is to pray.

Indeed, not much more can be done in view of an attack by hydrogen bombs than to advise all people living to hide beneath a very strong wall made of stone or cement, and to throw themselves on the ground and to cover the back of their heads, and the body if possible, with cloth. In this way it may be possible to escape annihilation and death through radiation. It is very important that the immediate survivors are given non-radioactive food and drink, and that they be removed immediately from the radioactive district.

It is impossible, however, to erect walls and concrete ceilings of adequate thickness to cover an entire city. Where would the material and the means come from? How would a population find time even to run to safety in such bunkers?

In an atomic war there would be neither conqueror nor vanquished. During such a bombardment both sides would suffer the same fate. A continuous destruction would take place and no armistice or peace proposals could bring it to an end.

When people deal with atomic weapons, it is not a matter of superior arms which will decide the issue between them, but only: “Now we want to commit suicide together, destroying each other mutually . . .”

There is a reason for an English M.P. saying: “He who uses atomic weapons becomes subject to the fate of a bee, namely, when it stings it will perish.”


Radioactive clouds resulting from a war between East and West would imperil humanity everywhere. There would be no need to use up the remaining stock of atomic and hydrogen bombs now running literally into the thousands.

A nuclear war is therefore the most senseless and lunatic act which could ever take place. This must be prevented.

When America had its atomic monopoly, it was not necessary to equip its allies with nuclear weapons. Owing to the end of the monopoly, however, this situation is changing. A whole family of nuclear weapons now exists that can be fitted into the military capability of smaller nations.

As a result, the United States is considering a de-

"Are we so certain that a mechanical decision is superior?"



—Clara Urquhart.

parture from its stated principle not to put atomic weapons into the hands of other countries. If it does so, this could have the gravest consequences. On the other hand, it is comprehensible that the United States wishes to supply the NATO countries with such new weapons for defence against the Soviet Union. The existence of such arms constitutes a new cause of war between the Soviet Union and the U.S., one that did not exist before. Thus, the ground is laid open for a nuclear conflict on European soil. The Soviet Union can be reached with long-range rockets from European soil, as far as Moscow and Kharkov, up to 2,400 miles away. Similarly, London, Paris, and Rome are within easy reach of Soviet rocketry.

Rockets of an average range may be used for defense purposes by Turkey and Iran against the Soviet Union. They could penetrate deeply into its country with arms accepted from America.

The Soviet Union is countering those measures. Both America and the Soviet Union may now seek alliances with the Middle East by offering those countries various kinds of financial support. Therefore, events in the Middle East could endanger the peace of the world.

The danger of an atomic war is being increased by the fact that no warning would be given in starting such a war. Indeed, it could erupt merely on the basis of some incident. Thus, the time factor enters—the side that attacks first would have the initial advantage over the attacked. At the very start, the attacked would find himself sustaining losses which would reduce his fighting capacity considerably.

As a result, one has to be on the alert all the time.

This factor constitutes an extreme danger in the event of a sudden outbreak of an atomic war. When one has to act with such speed, he has to reckon with the possibility that an error may occur on what is registered on the radar screen, and that this could result in the outbreak of an atomic war.

Attention was drawn to this danger by the American General Curtis LeMay. Quite recently the world found itself in such a situation. The radar station of the American Air Force and American Coastal Command indicated that an invasion of unidentified bombers was on the way. Upon this warning, the general who was in command of the strategic bomber force ordered that reprisal bombardment should be made. However, realizing that he was taking a great responsibility, he hesitated. Shortly afterwards, it was pointed out that the radar stations had committed a technical error. What could have happened if a less balanced general had been in his place!

In the future such dangers are likely to increase. Owing to the fact that small rockets exist which pass through the air with terrific speed and are over the target within a few minutes—defense possibilities become very limited. Only seconds remain to identify the markings on the radar screen, so that the counter-attack can spring into being. The theoretical defense consists in sending out missiles to explode the attacking missiles of the enemy before they complete their job, and also in releasing bombers with a view to destroying the ramps from which they are launched.

Such split-second operations cannot be left to the human brain. It works too slowly. The job has therefore been entrusted to an electronic brain.

Such are the heights of our civilization that a cold electronic brain rather than the moral conscience of man may decide human destiny. Are we so certain that an arithmetical or mechanical decision is really superior? The mechanism of the electronic brain may become faulty. It is dependent on the absolute reliability of its complicated functions. Everything has to click to the minutest detail.

UNDER the circumstances, the greater the number of countries, large or small, that become part of the nuclear arms terror the greater the terror. Naturally, America must assume that the weapons it entrusts to other nations will not be used irresponsibly. But accidents can happen. *Who* can guarantee that there may not be a "blacksheep" acting on his own, without troubling about the consequences? *Who* is *able* to keep *all* countries under a situation of rational control? The dam is punctured and it may break down.

That such worries have become very real is shown by the reasoning of the 9,235 scientists on January 13, who petitioned the United Nations regarding the cessation of atomic tests. The statement says: "As long as atomic weapons remain in the hands of the three great powers, agreement on control is possible. However, if the tests continue and extend to other countries in possession of atomic weapons, the risks and responsibilities in regard to an outbreak of an atomic war becomes all the greater. From every point of view the danger in a future atomic war becomes all the more intense, so that an urgent re-

"It would be fitting if those who have the responsibility confer"

nunciation of atomic weapons becomes absolutely imperative."

America has wisely declared that its objective is to outlaw nuclear weapons. Yet, at the same time, America seems to be moving away from the measures necessary to achieve it. America insists that the missiles it offers to other countries be accepted as quickly as possible. It wishes to hold such a position as to be able to maintain peace by nuclear deterrent. It happens, however, that most of the NATO countries are not in any hurry to acquire such weapons. An increasingly strengthening public opinion is the cause of this.

PUBLIC opinion in Europe has been convinced during recent months that under no circumstances should Europe be allowed to become a battlefield for an atomic war between the Soviet Union and America. From this position it will not deviate. The time is past when a European power could plan secretly to establish itself as a big power by manufacturing atomic weapons exclusively for its own use. In view of the fact that no public opinion would agree to such an undertaking, it becomes senseless even to prepare secretly for achieving such a plan.

Gone, too, is the time when NATO generals and European governments can decide on the establishments of launching sites and stockpiling of atomic weapons. In view of the fact that the dangers of atomic war and its consequences cannot be avoided, political procedure as employed hitherto can no longer be considered.

Only agreements that are sanctioned by public opinion are now valid.

PART III


What about the negotiations that could lead to the renunciation of nuclear weapons?

One reads and hears that the success of the projected Summit Conference must depend entirely on its every detail being diplomatically prepared beforehand. The best diplomacy is objectivity. One good way of preparing for a conference (if a respectful and well-meaning criticism is permissible) would be for the statesmen and other representatives to make a change from their present undiplomatic way of dealing with each other and to become diplomatic. Many unnecessary, thoughtless, discourteous, foolish, and offensive remarks have been made by both sides, and this has not been advantageous to the political atmosphere.

It would be fitting if those who have the authority to take the responsibility, and not those who have only nominal authority and who cannot move an inch from their instructions, would confer together.

It would be fitting to go ahead with the conference. For more than five months East and West have talked and written to one another, without any conclusions as to the date and the work program being reached. Public opinion everywhere is finding it difficult to accept this state of affairs and is beginning to ask itself whether a conference which comes into being so limpingly has any hope of really achieving anything.

It would be fitting to hold the conference in a town



—Erica Anderson.

in some neutral European country, for example, Geneva, as was the case in 1955.

It would be fitting that at this conference only questions that have to do directly with the control and renunciation of nuclear weapons should be discussed.

It would be fitting if not too many people were present at the summit meeting. Only the highest personalities of the three nuclear powers together with their experts and advisers should take their seats there.

Attendance could also be opened on a consultative basis to the representatives of those peoples who—like the NATO countries with America—have connections in nuclear matters; they could then state their opinions on the decisions that hold such grave consequences also for them.

Apart from this, experience teaches us that unnecessarily large attendance brings no advantage to a conference.

THE Summit Conference, therefore, is in no way an international or half international one, even though its decisions are of great importance to the whole of mankind.

The three nuclear powers and they alone must decide, in awareness of their responsibility to their peoples and to all mankind, whether or not they will renounce the testing and the use of nuclear weapons.

In regard to the planning of the conference, impartiality may justify one remark, which is that to date such planning has not been done objectively, and has therefore led nowhere. This leads to the thought that the outcome of a Summit Conference is bound to reflect what went into it.

What is the difference between the partial and the impartial; the fitting and the unfitting in this matter? It lies in the answer to the question on what basis the three nuclear powers decide whether or not to renounce the testing and the use of nuclear weapons.

The unobjective reply would be that the decision will

“... the most senseless way of endangering mankind”

depend on whether an agreement is first reached on comprehensive disarmament or not.

This is a false logic; it presumes that there could be an agreement acceptable to both the East and the West on this issue. But previous negotiations have shown that this is not to be expected; they became stalled right at the start because East and West have been unable to reach agreement even on the conditions under which such discussions should take place.

The anticipated procedure itself is by its very nature not impartial. It is based on false logic. The two vital issues so essential to the very existence of mankind—the cessation of tests and the disposal of nuclear weapons—cannot be made dependent on the Heavens performing the impossible political miracle that alone could insure that none of the three nuclear powers would have any objections to a complete agreement on disarmament.

The fact is that the testing and use of nuclear weapons carry in themselves the absolute reasons for their being renounced. Prior agreement on any other conditions cannot be considered.

Both cause the deepest damage to human rights. The tests do harm to peoples far from the territories of the nuclear powers—endangering their lives and their health—and this in peace time. An atomic war, with its resultant radioactivity, would make the land of peoples not participating in such a war, unlivable. It would be the most unimaginably senseless and cruel way of endangering the existence of mankind. That is why it must not be allowed to happen.

The three nuclear powers owe it to themselves and to mankind to reach agreement on these absolute essentials without first dealing with prior conditions.

The negotiations about disarmament are therefore not the forerunner of such agreement but the outcome of it. They start from the point where agreement on the nuclear issues has been reached, and their goal is to reach the point where the three nuclear powers and the peoples who are connected with them must agree on guarantees that will seek to avert the danger of a threat of a non-atomic nature taking the place of the previous danger. Everything that the diplomats will have done objectively to prepare the preliminaries to the conference will keep its meaning even if it will be used not before renunciation, but as the result of it.

Should agreement be reached on the outlawing of nuclear weapons, this by itself will lead to a great improvement in the political situation. As a result of such an agreement, time and distance would again become realities with their own right.

Nuclear weapons, used in conjunction with missiles, change a distant war to a war fought at close range. The Soviet Union and the United States have become next-door neighbors in the modern world but live in constant fear of their lives every minute.

But if nuclear arms should be abolished, the proximity factor would be made less explosive.

Today America has her batteries of nuclear missiles readily available in Europe. Europe has become a connecting land strip between America and Russia, as if the Atlantic had disappeared and the continents had been joined.

But if atomic missiles are outlawed on the basis of

effective and enforceable control, this unnatural state of affairs would come to an end. America would again become wholly America; Europe wholly Europe; the Atlantic again wholly the Atlantic Ocean.

THE great sacrifices that America brought to Europe during the Second World War and in the years following it will not be forgotten. The many-sided and great help that Europe received from her and the thanks owing for this will not be forgotten.

But the unnatural situation created by the two world wars, that led to a dominating military presence in Europe, cannot continue indefinitely. It must gradually cease to exist—both for the sake of Europe and for the sake of America.

Now there will be shocked voices from all sides: What will become of poor Europe if American atomic weapons no longer defend it from within and from without? Will Europe be delivered to the Soviet? Must it be prepared to languish in a Communist-Babylonian imprisonment for long years?

What Europe and the Europeans have to agree about is that they belong together for better or for worse. This is a new historical fact that can no longer be by-passed politically.


Another factor that must be recognized politically is that it is no longer a question of subjugating peoples, but learning to get along with them intellectually, culturally, spiritually.

A Europe standing on its own has no reason to despair.

Disarmament discussions between the three nuclear powers must seek the guarantees that can bring about actual, total and durable disposal of nuclear weapons. The question of control and safeguards is a vital one. Reciprocal agreement will have to be reached about allowing international commissions to inspect and investigate on national soil.

One talks of giving aircraft belonging to a world police the right to fly at medium and high altitudes for purposes of aerial inspection.

One asks to what extent a state would be willing to



—Clara Urquhart.

“ . . . we must strive to concede to each other our moral capacity ”

subject itself to such control? It may be said that unfortunate incidents could easily occur as a result. And what about the power that should be entrusted to such a world control? Even the widest form of such control could never insure that everywhere and all the time war could be avoided. But it represents a reasonable basis on which, given time and some relaxation of tension, a workable world system of security might be built.

The same applies also in another matter. As a result of renouncing nuclear arms, the Soviet Union's military might insofar as Europe is concerned would be less affected than that of America. There would remain to the Soviet the many armed divisions with conventional weapons; with those divisions it could easily over-run the NATO states in western Europe—particularly Western Germany—without it being possible for anyone to come to their aid. With this in mind, the Soviet Union should agree in the course of disarmament negotiations to reduce her army, and to commit herself not to undertake steps against Germany. But here, too, no manner of detailed agreements and internationally guaranteed disarmament agreements would be enough. Therefore, we must strive continually to improve the situation, building brick by brick.

We live at a time when the good faith of peoples is doubted more than ever before. Expressions putting into doubt the trustworthiness of the next nation are bandied back and forth. They are based on what happened in the two world wars when the nations experienced dishonesty, injustice, and inhumanity from one another. How can a new trust come about?

We cannot continue in a situation of paralyzing mistrust. If we want to work our way out of the desperate situation in which we find ourselves another spirit must enter into the people. It can only come if the awareness of its necessity suffices to give us strength to believe in its coming. We must presuppose the awareness of this need in all the peoples who have suffered along with us. We must approach them in the spirit that we are human beings, all of us, and that we feel ourselves fitted to feel with each other; to think and to will together in the same way.

The awareness that we are all human beings together has become lost in war and politics. We have reached the point of regarding each other as only members of a people who is allied with us or against us, and our attitudes, prejudices, sympathies, or antipathies are all conditioned

by that fact. Now we must rediscover the fact that we—all together—are human beings, and that we must strive to concede to each other what moral capacity we have.

That way we can begin to believe that also in other peoples there will arise the need for a new spirit, and that can be the beginning of a feeling of mutual trustworthiness towards each other. The spirit is a mighty force for transforming things. Let us have hope that the spirit can bring people and lands back to an awareness of enlightenment.

At this stage we have the choice of two risks. The one consists in continuing the mad atomic arms race with its danger of unavoidable atomic war in the near future. The other is in the renunciation of nuclear weapons, and the hope that America and the Soviet Union, and the peoples associated with them, will manage to live in peace. The first holds no hope of a prosperous future; the second does. We must risk the second.

In President Eisenhower's speech of November 7, 1957, we find the following: "What the world needs more than a gigantic leap into space is a gigantic leap into peace."

This gigantic leap consists in finding the courage to hope that the spirit of good sense will arise in all peoples and in all lands, a spirit sufficiently strong to overcome the insanity and the inhumanity.

Once agreement on renunciation of nuclear arms has been reached it would be the responsibility of the United Nations to undertake to see that now, as in the future, they would neither be made nor used. The danger that one or another people might attempt to manufacture nuclear weapons will have to be kept in mind for a long time.

The future holds many difficult problems. The most difficult of these will be the rights of access of over-populated countries to neighboring lands.

But if in our time we renounce nuclear arms we will have taken the first step on the way to the distant goal of the end to war itself. If we do not do this we remain on the road that leads to atomic war and misery in the near future.

Those who are to meet at the Summit must be aware of this, so that they can negotiate with propriety, with the right degree of seriousness, and with a full sense of responsibility.

The Summit Conference must not fail. The will of mankind will not permit it.

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